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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Interbank lending is one mechanism that can make shock, which is accepted by one bank spread to other 
banks (contagion). There are several researchers that focused their research on analyzing the effect of 
interbank lending to systemic risk. However, there is a few research that analyzed the effect of banks’ 
decision maker’s behavior, especially on the bank interbank lending to the systemic risk. In this research, the 
author creates an agent-based  simulation of the banking system to analyze the effect of banks’ decision 
maker’s behavior to systemic risk in economic downturn condition. The preliminary result from this research 
is for an economic downturn in a long time period, the banking system with a low net worth to the asset's 
ratio threshold will produce more default bank than the banking system with a high net worth to the asset's 
ratio threshold. However, for an economic downturn in small time period, banking system which all bank in 
their system has the higher net worth to assets ratio threshold will have the default bank first than the banking 
system which has the lower net worth to the asset's ratio threshold. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Systemic failure in the financial sector is 
one of the risk that many countries try to 
prevent. This caused by cost systemic failure 
has estimated to be large (Hoggarth et al., 
2002) and crisis in all or part of banking sector 
can create cost on the economy of a country as 
a whole or parts within it (Hoggarth et al., 
2002), (Kaufman, 1996).  
 
There are several channels that can make 
shock accepted by one bank transmitted and to 
other banks (Upper, 2011). One of the channels 
is interbank lending. To study the effect of 
interbank lending and bank structure resilience 
to systemic failure, many researcher use 
computer simulation. However, there are few 
researches in this field that included the 
behavior of banks’ decision makers. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Systemic failure happened because loss 
(shock) that accepted by one bank transmitted 
to other banks. This property called bank 
contagion. Contagion in the banking system 
can take place through a multitude of channels 
(Upper, 2011). One of the channels of bank 
contagion is through interbank lending. In 
interbank market one bank can give lending to 
other banks that needs money. There are two 
functions that interbank market can do 
(Bhattacharya and Gale, 1987). The first 
function is as a device for co-insurance against 
liquidity shocks. The second function is as a 
mechanism to absorb shock that hit the 
banking system. However, interbank market 
also can give bad impact to the financial 
system. This is because interbank connection 
can make shock that accepted by one bank 
spread to other banks (contagion). 
 
In order to study how interbank 
connection many researcher use computer 
simulation that based on graph theory. This 
approach used because the scarcity of 
theoretical results. Several researcher that use 
this approach are Allen and Gale (1998), Allen 
and Gale (2000), Diamond and Dybvig (1983), 
and Rochet and Tirole (1996). 
 
Nier et al. (2008) also used computer 
simulation to study about interbank connection. 
In their study they found that there are several 
aspects in bank system structure that can affect 
bank system resilience to systemic risk. Nier et 
al. (2008) shows how condition of bank’s net 
worth (capital), level of interbank lending, and 
level of capital can affect bank system 
resilience. One of their results is negative and 
non-linear relationship between contagion and 
capital. This result means higher capital can 
make the bank system more resilience to 
systemic risk. Although there are many 
research about systemic risk and interbank 
contagion, but there still the weakness on it. 
Based on Upper (2011) one of the weaknesses 
is there is no behavioral foundation in it. In 
reality, bank can anticipate the shock that can 
happen and make some preparation to face it. 
One of the anticipation that they can do is by 
taking back their lending from the bank that 
can go default.  
 
To Overcome this weakness, one 
approach that can be used is by using agent-
based simulation. This is because agent-based 
simulation can copy agent’s behavior (Axtell, 
2000). Based on simulation that created by 
Nier et al. (2008), Novanto and Koesrindartoto 
(2011) develop an agent-based simulation that 
included behavior of bank decision makers in 
interbank lending. From their research we 
conclude that for crisis in a long time period, 
the banking system with the low net worth to 
the asset's ratio threshold will produce more 
default bank than the banking system with a 
high net worth to the asset's ratio threshold. 
However, for crisis in small time period, 
banking system which has a higher net worth 
to assets ratio threshold will have the default 
bank first than the banking system which has a 
lower net worth to the asset's ratio threshold. 
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In this paper, we analyze the effect of 
bank decision maker behavior and bank system 
structure, especially in their initial percentage 
of net worth. 
 
3.1.    Model Building 
 
The general overview of the simulation 
process is described in figure 1. (See appendix 
figure1)  
 
3.2.    Bank Network Initialization 
 
In this simulation, bank system 
represented as nodes and directed lines. Node 
represents a bank and directed line represented 
direct lending relationship from a bank that 
gives lending to bank that borrow money from 
that bank. To initialize the bank network, we 
use two parameters, that is the number of bank 
(N) and connection probability, that is, 
probability one bank has lent to another bank 
(p). We make simplification by use same 
connection probability for each bank. 
 
3.3.  Model of Individual Bank Balance 
Sheet 
 
After banking network already 
constructed, we develop individual bank 
balance sheet. In agent-based simulation, bank 
represented as the agent and bank balance 
sheet represented as agent properties. The to 
develop individual balance sheet, we use same 
approach developed by Nier et al. (2008). In 
their approach, they begin from general 
banking system properties such as initial total 
external asset, initial number of bank, 
connection probability, percent interbank to 
total asset, percent net worth to total asset. 
From these properties, they applied some 
algorithm and made every bank have their 
individual balance sheet. Bank individual 
balance sheet consist of external assets and 
interbank assets in their asset's side and their 
liabilities side consists of customer deposit, 
interbank borrowing, and net worth. 
 
4.    Model of Banks Operation 
 
To simulate how bank decision maker 
behavior react to changing in their 
environment, we create this simulation in 
multi-period simulation. In the multi-period 
simulation how assets and liabilities changes 
dynamically over time should be modeled. 
Assets of a bank will change every time 
depends on profit or loss that they get from 
their assets’ allocation. Their liabilities will 
also change because a bank must give interest 
to their depositor, and their net worth will 
change depends on the value of the assets and 
depositor’s deposit or interbank borrowing. 
 
In this study, assets of a bank are divided 
into two parts, there are the external assets, 
denoted by v, and interbank asset, denoted by d. 
External assets in this study change 
dynamically following the geometric Brownian 
motion with constant drift μ and volatility σ > 
0 where W is standard Brownian motion. This 
approach is also used in Liang et al. (2011) in 
their paper to create a model of a bank running 
for liquidity risk. For time t ∈ (0, T), value of 
external assets follows (2), value of interbank 
assets or bank lending with interbank lending 
intere r . st ate ri follows (3)
೟ௗ௏
௏೟
ൌ ߤ݀ݐ ൅
݀௧ ൌ ݁௥೔௧݀଴         (3) 
 ߪ݀ ௧ܹ    (2) 
 
Liabilities sides of the bank are divided 
into three parts, there is the customer deposit, 
denoted by d, interbank borrowing, denoted by 
b, and net worth, denoted by w. For time t ∈ 
(0,T), value of customer deposit with interest 
rate rd follows (4), value of interbank 
borrowing with interbank borrowing interest 
rate rb follows (5). The value of net worth is 
ne by setting assets equal to liabilities determi d 
       
(6). 
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5.    Shock and Shock Transmission 
 
In this study, shock defined as all 
circumstances that can reduce the value of a 
bank’s external assets or interbank asset. Value 
of a bank’s external assets can be reduced 
because of loss or depreciation in their 
investment or credit default. Reduce in 
interbank asset happened because other banks 
that borrow money from this bank default and 
can’t give back all money that they borrow. 
 
In general, if a bank gets a small shock 
this bank only loses a small amount of money, 
and they will withstand the shock. However, if 
the shock is bigger than the bank's net worth 
then this bank default. If the net worth can’t 
absorb all shock, the residual transmitted to 
creditor banks through interbank liabilities. 
This shock will transmit equally to every bank 
that gives lending to bank that get that shock. 
If interbank liabilities still cannot absorb the 
shock, then shock is absorbed by depositors. 
 
In this study, if one bank is default, 
then this bank takes all his lending and gives 
back this bank’s borrowing to bank that gives 
this bank lending. Banks that give lending to 
the default bank put money, that default bank 
gives back, to its external asset. Bank that 
borrows from this bank must give back their 
borrowing and balance their balance sheet by 
reduce their external asset. 
 
6. Bank’s Decision on Their Interbank 
Lending 
 
In each tick, every bank will analyze 
other banks financial condition. We simplified 
how each bank sees other banks financial 
condition by their net worth to the asset’s ratio. 
Bank with a low ratio indicates their financial 
strength is not in good condition. Bank with a 
high ratio indicates their financial strength in 
good condition and can accept bigger shock.  
 
In this simulation, every bank has the 
same threshold which if other banks that they 
give lending have the net worth to the asset's 
ratio threshold lower than this threshold, then 
the bank that gives lending will take back their 
lending. In this simulation, by using the 
different net worth to the asset’s threshold we 
analyze how bank behavior in manage their 
interbank lending can make the difference in 
bank system resilience. 
 
7.    Simulation Result 
 
To see how the initial percentage of 
net worth and behavior of the bank decision 
makers in their interbank lending, we simulate 
the model that already developed with 
parameter that shown in table 1. (See appendix 
table 1) 
 
To mimic economic downturn, we use 
negative external assets drift. Each simulation 
consists of 52 ticks. In each tick, each bank 
external assets decrease follows geometric 
Brownian motion with negative drift. In this 
simulation, we assume that in the economic 
downturn every bank not makes new lending to 
other banks. They only take decisions do they 
take their lending from other banks or not. 
 
In this study, we use six net worth to 
the asset's ratio threshold from 0%, 2%, 4%, 
6%, and 8%. Bank with the net worth to the 
asset's ratio threshold equals to 0% represented 
as the bank that their decision maker still not 
takes their lending even bank that borrows to 
them nearly default. These different thresholds 
represent the different behavior of the bank 
decision makers in the bank system. We 
simulate this simulation 50 times and get the 
average results and present the simulation 
results in figure 3, 4 and 5. (See appendix 
figure 3,4,5) 
 
In general, percentage of net worth has 
a high impact in bank resilience in systemic 
risk. Higher net worth to the asset's ratio 
threshold makes fewer banks that default. 
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For a long-term economic downturn, we 
can conclude that behavior of the bank 
decision makers have an impact to number of 
the bank that defaults. In this simulation, bank 
system with behavior of their agent who take 
back their lending when their borrower net 
worth to the asset's ratio reaches the lower 
threshold have more percentage of default 
banks higher than the bank system with 
behavior of their agent who takes back their 
lending when their borrower net worth to the 
asset's ratio threshold higher. 
 
In the small time period, we can conclude 
that bank system with the higher percentage of 
net worth can survive in the economic 
downturn in the small time period than the 
bank system with the lower percentage of net 
worth. Behavior of bank decision makers in 
extending or take back their loan effect to 
number of default banks. In the bank system 
with the same percentage of net worth, the 
higher net worth to the asset's ratio threshold 
that their agent has the increase of the number 
of default banks will be slower than the bank 
system with the lower net worth to the asset's 
ratio threshold that their agent has. This result 
happened because the bank system with 
behavior of their member has the higher net 
worth to the asset's ratio threshold have fewer 
probabilities to get the shock that transmitted 
from interbank market. 
 
8.    Conclusion 
 
This study shows how the percentage of net 
worth before the bank system at the beginning 
of an economic downturn and how behavior of 
the bank's decision makers in extending their 
interbank lending can affect bank system 
resilience to systemic failure. 
 
In general, for all percentage of net worth, 
banking systems with behavior of their bank 
that take back their lending when their 
borrower percentage of net worth higher has 
the lower number of default banks than 
banking systems with behavior of their bank 
that take back their lending when their 
borrower percentage of net worth lower. 
However, banking system with behavior of 
their bank that take back their lending when 
their borrower percentage of net worth higher 
has the defaults bank in advance rather than 
banking systems with behavior of their bank 
that take back their lending when their 
borrower percentage of net worth lower. 
From that result, the central banks or 
financial regulators should pay attention and 
monitor percentage of net worth (capital) and 
interbank lending, especially when a country 
face both in short or long time durations of an 
economic downturn. With appropriate policies 
to regulate the behavior of the bank, then the 
number of bank that defaults can be reduced. 
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Appendix 
Table 1. Summary of benchmark parameter 
Parameter Simulation Benchmark 
Total external assets 100000 
Number of banks 25 
Connection probability 0.2 
Percentage of interbank assets to total assets 20% 
Percentage of net worth to total assets 1% to 15% 
External assets drift  -0.288% 
External assets volatility  0.192% 
 
 
Figure 1. The general overview of the simulation process  
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Figure 2. Example bank network consists of twelve banks 
 
 
Figure 3. Dynamic percentage of default banks with net worth to the asset’s ratio threshold = 0 
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Figure 4. Dynamic percentage of default banks with net worth to the asset’s ratio threshold = 0.1 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Impact of bank capitalization and bank behavior 
 
